This paper examines the investment effects of tax subsidies for which some assets and not others are eligible. Distortionary tax subsidies concentrate investments in tax-favored assets, thereby reducing the expected pre-tax profitability of investment and reducing payoffs to bondholders in
Introduction
Governments frequently use tax policies to encourage certain activities and discourage others.
Higher rates of taxation generally reduce aggregate business investment, but it is common for certain assets to receive preferential tax treatment designed to enhance their attractiveness to investors. In the United States, the prevailing view of such preferences is decidedly skeptical; nevertheless, the current U.S. tax code offers special incentives for foreign investment, investment in R&D, and other restricted categories of activity. In the years before 1987, the use of special incentives was considerably more widespread.
This essay examines the impact of tax incentives that are limited to specific categories of investments. The results indicate that, if there is a chance that firms will default on their debts, these tax incentives have significantly smaller effects on aggregate investment than they do when firms are certain not to default. Indeed, there are plausible circumstances in which higher tax subsidy rates may reduce total investment by firms receiving the incentives. The reason is that tax preferences for specific activities indirectly discourage others by worsening the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders. Bondholders do not benefit from investment tax incentives, since the state of the world about which they are most concerned -bankruptcy -is one in which tax incentives are valueless since firms have no tax liabilities.
If a firm loses money and is unable to pay off its debts, bondholders may be able to claim the firm's assets (net of its operating losses and any costs associated with bankruptcy). Conflict of interest stems from anticipation of this possibility, since shareholders, who control firms, invest in assets to maximize returns in those states of the world in which they, and not bondholders, are the residual claimants. Optimizing equity investors allocate resources between assets so as to equalize after-tax marginal returns. Bondholders prefer that firms equalize before-tax marginal returns, since such a rule maximizes the value of the firm if in default. Since the bond market anticipates that shareholder-controlled firms invest to maximize after-tax returns, borrowing rates rise in response to the introduction of specific investment tax incentives. Higher interest rates, in turn, reduce profits and make investment more costly. It is possible that interest rate reactions are so powerful that firms reduce total investment in response to greater incentives.
The agency problems between bondholders and shareholders generate inefficient outcomes that could be avoided if borrowers and lenders had perfect information about present and future conditions and could use enforceable and complete debt contracts specifying the types of investments firms are permitted to undertake. An efficient contract would appropriately weight the interests of both bondholders and shareholders. In practice it is not possible to draft perfectly efficient bond contracts; instead, bonds may have covenants containing rather crude restrictions on the disposition of funds by borrowers, or the financial circumstances in which loans may be called.
The model analyzed in the paper assumes that lenders do not have sufficient information to write bond covenants that avoid the agency problems created by tax incentives, and the empirical work examines the use of bond covenants in practice.
As an alternative, the agency problems created by debt contracts could be avoided by financing firms entirely by equity, but doing so means relinquishing the tax benefits of debt described by Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Stiglitz (1973) , and foregoing access to an important market for funds.
The apparent little power of tax incentives to stimulate aggregate investment spending is one of the puzzles of the empirical investment literature. 1 Part of the solution may lie in the noisiness of investment data, empirical specifications that are insensitive to decision making lags and adjustment costs, the importance of cash flow and other omitted variables, and the endogeneity of capital asset prices to investment demand. 2 This essay considers an additional possibility: that standard empirical specifications incorrectly capture the impact of tax incentives on the demand for capital. Since corporate borrowing rates reflect the bond market's anticipation of behavior that is endogenous to tax incentives, it is inappropriate to treat interest rates on corporate debt as exogenous in evaluating the effects of tax policies on investment.
Jorgenson-style cost of capital calculations imply that tax incentives for investments in specific assets affect the composition of new investment and increase the total volume of investment.
These implications depend on an assumed zero probability of bankruptcy. The model in this essay implies that if there is a chance that investors will default on their debts, then these two phenomena -significant asset substitution and rapidly rising total investment -should not both accompany higher distortionary tax subsidies.
There is an extensive literature on the inability of some firms -typically, those in tax loss situations -to benefit from the availability of tax deductions or tax credits. 3 Most of these situations reflect the tax law's asymmetric treatment of profits and losses. This problem is typically treated as one in which firms that act in the interest of their shareholders react little to tax subsidies if there is a substantial probability of having tax losses. There is, however, a potentially much more powerful implication of the asymmetric treatment of profits and losses that stems from the inability of creditors of bankrupt firms to use their accumulated tax credits. Neither of these implications is important if owners of unprofitable firms can benefit from tax incentives by effectively selling them to profitable firms through takeovers or sale-leaseback operations. In practice, unprofitable firms seldom benefit from tax credits; 4 this essay analyzes cases in which investors anticipate that tax credits have no value to firms with tax losses.
It is well established that bond prices are correlated with a firm's profitability, 5 but the distinction between pre-tax and after-tax profitability has heretofore received scant if any attention in empirical studies of bond pricing. The provision of extremely generous depreciation allowances for U.S. equipment investment, but not for other investment, during 2002-2004 encouraged firms to distort the composition of investment in favor of tax-preferred assets. 6 Detailed evidence of bond covenants from time periods prior to 2002, the 2002-2004 period, and after 2004 confirm that borrowing contracts during the bonus depreciation period were more likely than at other times to contain significant restrictions. These covenants were concentrated among contracts involving borrowers with precarious financial situations and whose assets were concentrated among equipment investments that were the focus of the tax-induced distortion. Corporate borrowing fell during the bonus depreciation period, with the decline concentrated among financially precarious firms whose assets were concentrated in equipment investment.
Section 2 of the paper analyzes the properties of a simple model in which certain assets receive favorable tax treatment. Section 3 considers extensions of the model. Section 4 examines evidence from bond contracts before, during, and after the 2002-2004 bonus depreciation period. Section 5 is the conclusion.
Model
In order to clarify the issues raised by distortionary tax incentives, it is useful to analyze a model in which management acts in the interest of shareholders and there is no conflict between the interests of shareholders and the interests of bondholders in the absence of taxation. More general treatments of the investment problem would consider situations in which there are interactions between various agency problems, including those introduced by taxation.
Framework
Consider a firm that invests in two assets, K 1 and K 2 , prior to the realization of a stochastic shock to its output. For simplicity the model has only two periods; the firm chooses K 1 and K 2 in the first period, while the state of the world is revealed and contracts are closed in the second. The firm's (reduced-form) production function is y(K 1 , K 2 )θ in which y(·) is a deterministic function and θ ∈ [0, ∞], is the realization of the shock. The production function is taken to be concave and homothetic, which rules out unusual outcomes stemming simply from output scale effects.
Output is assumed to be verifiable to all investors. θ is distributed according to a known density function g(θ).
Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral, in the sense that managers maximize expected profits 5 See, for example, Kwan (1996) . 6 House and Shapiro (2008) offer evidence that U.S. firms significantly increased their investment in classes of equipment that received the greatest increase in tax benefits during 2002-2004, relative to investment in other classes of equipment.
without regard to the correlation between θ and the market return. Alternatively, one can think of θ as reflecting purely idiosyncratic shocks to a firm's production function.
Assets 1 and 2 each depreciate at one-period rate δ. 7 The firm's investments are financed by a combination of owner's equity (E) and bonds (B) held by unrelated parties. Aggregate firm capital is denoted K ≡ K 1 + K 2 ; the firm's capital constraint is the requirement that K ≤ E + B.
The shock, θ, is realized at the start of the second period. The realization of θ influences both the pre-tax profitability of the firm and its tax liability. There are three possible outcomes in the second period. The first possibility is that the firm is profitable and has positive tax liability. If so, the firm pays corporate taxes at rate τ on its output net of interest charges and depreciation.
In addition, and this is the focus of the subsequent analysis, the firm receives a tax credit of c for every unit of K 1 it installs. The second possibility is that the firm has tax losses (and therefore no tax liability) but is not in default. The third possibility is that the firm's revenues are so low that it defaults on its debt obligations.
The tax credit is assumed to be nonrefundable if the firm has tax losses. Nonrefundability is at the heart of the agency problem, since the bondholders, who are residual claimants on the firm's assets in the event of default, receive no benefits from the tax credit because default is also a state in which the firm has no tax obligations.
Aggregate production is a function of K, the total capital stock, and its allocation between assets 1 and 2. Since the production function is homothetic, the interasset allocation of capital is independent of the scale of output, being instead a function of the relative cost of the two assets as determined by c. It is useful to introduce the following quasi-reduced form notation for output: Q(K, c)θ, in which Q(K, c) = y [Kσ 1 (c), K(1 − σ 1 (c))] and σ 1 ≡ K 1 /K is the firm's share of credit-eligible capital.
A firm that borrows in the first period must redeem its debt, along with any agreed-upon interest, in the second period, unless the firm defaults, in which case bondholders are entitled to seize control of the firm and its assets. r(B, K, c) denotes the required payment (in nonbankruptcy states) to debtholders in the second period, representing interest [r(B, K, c) − B] plus repayment of debt principle (B). As the notation indicates, interest rates are functions of total borrowing, total investing (and thereby implicitly the equity contributions of shareholders), and the incentives created by the tax system. Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events. In the first period, investors commit E of equity to the firm, after which the firm borrows B in the bond market. The firm then selects K 1 and K 2 .
Shareholders of profitable, taxpaying firms receive:
7 As a general matter, assets depreciate at differing rates -and in particular, the history of U.S. experience with investment tax credits is that tax-favored assets tend to have higher depreciation rates. This issue is important in interpreting the empirical work presented in section 4. Depreciation rates are assumed to be equal in this section in order to consider a situation in which there is no conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders in the absence of special tax incentives.
The term in braces is the firm's sales revenue, minus the sum of its depreciation charges and interest payments. Depreciation for tax purposes is assumed to equal economic depreciation. The second term in the expression (-B) reflects the repayment of debt principle. Finally, investors have claims on the firm's capital stock and receive the tax credits associated with investing in K 1 .
It is possible that the firm's earnings will be sufficient to cover its required payment of r(B, K, c) to bondholders but insufficient to generate positive tax liability, either because the firm incurs losses or because its tax credits (cKσ 1 ) equal or exceed its tax liabilities. 8 Since the firm pays no taxes, shareholders receive:
The third possibility is that the firm's losses are so great that bondholders cannot be fully paid off; instead, bondholders receive the firm's assets (net of operating losses and bankruptcy costs) and shareholders receive nothing in the second period.
Shareholder expected profits (π e ) are:
in which p 1 denotes the support of the distribution of θ over which the firm has positive tax liability and θ 1 is the average value of θ within that region. Similarly, p 2 denotes the support of the distribution of θ over which the firm meets its debt obligations but has no tax liability; θ 2 is the average value of θ within that region. For notational simplicity it is convenient to treat θ as though it has a point distribution taking the value θ 1 with probability p 1 , the value θ 2 with probability p 2 , and the value θ 3 with probability p 3 , in which p 1 + p 2 + p 3 = 1 and p 3 is the probability of default. 9 p 1 is defined to equal the probability of θ falling in the range that:
p 2 is defined to equal the probability of falling in the range that:
Expected returns as defined in (1) are operating returns that make no allowance for the cost of invested equity (E). Denote the opportunity cost of equity (measured in second period units)
by ρ. The firm chooses K 1 , K 2 , B, and E to maximize:
subject to:
The first-order condition corresponding to maximizing (2) over the choice of K, subject to (3), is:
in which λ ≥ 0 is the lagrange multiplier corresponding to the value of the constraint (3). In addition, there are two first order conditions corresponding to alternative sources of finance:
which must be satisfied for firms issuing positive amounts of debt, and
for firms with positive equity. In equilibrium, firms using both debt and equity must be indifferent between them (as in Miller (1977) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) ). Market equilibrium is characterized by firms with internal debt-equity ratios that generate probabilities of bankruptcy making them indifferent at the margin between the two sources of finance. In order to evaluate the role of tax parameters in influencing the cost of debt (and therefore also equity) finance, it is necessary to consider the nature of equilibrium in the bond market.
Bond Market Equilibrium
Interest rates on risky debt reflect the requirement that lenders receive risk-adjusted normal returns. Bondholders receive r(B, K, c) if the firm is solvent in period two, and receive less if the firm is insolvent. Bondholders of bankrupt firms are entitled to seize their assets, though the process of doing so typically entails some costs. Recognizing these costs, shareholders and bondholders of firms in default often prefer to settle their claims without recourse to formal bankruptcy proceedings. A simplified characterization of default is that bondholders receive in period two the firm's assets, net of its operating losses, and net of associated bankruptcy costs.
Lenders are assumed to know B and K, but not to be able to contract over the breakdown of K into K 1 and K 2 . Denoting the required certainty-equivalent rate of interest by r, bond market equilibrium requires that
in which the first term on the right side of (7) is the payoff to bondholders in non-bankruptcy states, and the second term is the payoff in bankruptcy. For the purpose of this expression, any bankruptcy costs are assumed to be incorporated in the relevant value of θ 3 . Differentiating (7),
and
Equation (9) reflects that additional borrowing yields bondholders (in aggregate) no additional returns in bankruptcy states, since bondholders receive simply the value of the firm (minus bankruptcy costs), which is unaffected by the amount of capital raised on the debt market.
By contrast, (8) illustrates that new investment reduces interest rates, since with B held constant, any additional investment is financed with equity. Equity-financed investments reduce the severity of bankruptcy outcomes from the standpoint of bondholders, though the extent to which new investments reduce interest rates is a function of differences between shareholder and bondholder interests induced by nonzero values of c.
Investment Implications
Combining (4), (5), (8) and (9),
This equation is standard in the Hall-Jorgenson analysis of investment, since if p 1 =1 and
In that setting, changes in c have direct impact on the marginal product of capital and an implied effect on capital demand.
Earlier studies analyze the importance of p 2 > 0 in reducing the impact of c on investment. In the setting described by (10), however, p 3 > 0 has much greater potential to affect the impact of c on capital demand than does p 2 > 0.
Since the influential work of Hall and Jorgenson (1967) , it is customary to evaluate the investment effects of tax policies by calculating tax-induced changes in the cost of capital. In equation (10), the cost of capital appears as
∂K , the tax-induced marginal product of capital.
Decomposing the effect of c on
in which the first term on the right side of (11) is the change in the cost of capital due to interactions between changes in investment levels and the concavity of the production function, and the second term on the right side is the change in the marginal product of capital induced by substitution of K 1 for K 2 . Since the effect of c on output, holding K fixed, stems from induced changes in the composition of capital inputs, it follows that
It is straightforward to establish, in a manner similar to the derivation of (4), that the firm's profit-maximizing choice of K 1 and K 2 satisfies:
Since the right side of (13) is independent of K, it follows that (12) implies:
Totally differentiating (10) yields:
Then rearranging (11), and imposing (14), (13) and (15) implies:
It is useful to define a measure, f , of the extent to which the firm's output is expected to come in default states:
If default is impossible (p 3 =0) then f =0. If p 2 =0 then f = p 3 θ 3 /p 1 θ 1 , so f may exceed unity at sufficiently high default probabilities. Then letting
define the elasticity of the share of capital of type one in the firm's capital stock with respect to the tax credit, (16) becomes:
Concavity of the production function implies that
< 0, so (1 − f η) < 0 means that dK dc < 0. Higher tax credit rates reduce investment if f η > 1, which arises if substantial fractions of output come in default states of the world and if firms substitute strongly toward tax-preferred assets in response to higher tax credits. These two conditions are jointly necessary, since if f =0, then default is impossible and there is no agency cost associated with shareholder control of the firm, while if η=0, then firms do not respond to tax credits by substituting assets in a way that is costly to bondholders.
It is noteworthy that, from its definition, η=0 if The term (1 − f η) in (17) is the factor by which excessive asset substitution reduces the investment impact of specific tax subsidies. 10 In order to evaluate the magnitude of this factor, it is useful to replace η in with a more commonly-estimated parameter, , the elasticity of substitution between K 1 and K 2 . The substitution elasticity is:
in which c 1 is the user cost of capital goods of type one and c 2 is the user cost of capital goods of type two. From its definition,
. Furthermore, homotheticity of the production function implies that
, since ratios of factor inputs are affected by relative costs but not by output levels. Consequently,
From the standard Hall-Jorgenson formula, the user cost of capital of type one, for an investment financed by equity, is:
which r e is the appropriatelyadjusted required rate of return on equity investment, and z is the present discounted value of depreciation allowances. It is appropriate to use this expression because firms are indifferent at the margin between financing investments with debt and with equity. It follows that
Finally, the 10 Since p1 premultiplies the right side of (17), the term (1−f η) captures the effect of asset substitution conditional on potential unprofitability. Previous studies of investment tax incentives when p1 < 1 implicitly assume that p2 = 1 − p1, and therefore p3 = 0, so it is necessary to adjust their calculations by (1 − f η) when p3 > 0. present value of economic depreciation allowances is given by z = δ r+δ (Hall and Jorgenson (1971) ). These substitutions yield:
High values of f and c, and large negative values of , conspire greatly to reduce dK dc . For example, if f = 1, σ 1 = 0.2, c = 0.3, τ = 0.45, δ = .10, r = 0.05, and =-1, then (1 − f η) =0.4.
With otherwise the same parameters but =-2, (1 − f η) =-0.2. At higher absolute values of , asset substitution means that small increments to c will be accompanied by significant shifting of investment into tax-favored assets with relatively low pre-tax marginal products. Higher values of f likewise reduce dK dc . While calculations can illustrate the possibility that investment falls with higher levels of c, the more general point is that it is necessary to adjust standard cost of capital formulas by the factor (1 − f η) in order to capture the incentives created by the tax system.
Implications for Profitability
The same considerations that reduce the investment impact of specific tax credits also reduce the effect of higher tax credits on profitability. Indeed, identical terms appear in both the profitability and investment equations. Higher tax credit rates raise borrowing costs as lenders anticipate substitution into tax-preferred assets. If this effect is sufficiently large, it can overwhelm the direct effect of tax credits on profitability.
Differentiating the bond market equation (7) produces:
which, together with (12) and (13), implies:
From (1) and the envelope theorem, the effect of c on expected profits is:
Then combining (21) and (22) yields:
the right side of which is identical to the right side of (17). The same moral hazard costs associated with higher tax credit rates that reduce investment also reduce expected profitability. Since investors must be indifferent between holding riskless government debt and risky corporate bonds, the costs or benefits of distortionary tax incentives are borne entirely by shareholders. Figure 2 illustrates the equivalent (and much more easily depicted) effect of tax credits on the cost of producing a given quantity of output. The two solid lines in the figure reflect after-tax relative prices of K 1 and K 2 before and after the introduction of a credit for purchases of K 1 .
For simplicity consider the case in which p 2 = 0, so that the firm is either taxable or bankrupt.
The distance between the points at which the two budget lines, tangent to the same isoquant, intersect the vertical axis equals the cost reduction for which the tax credit is responsible if the firm is taxable. The dotted line in Figure 2 is constructed to be parallel to the original price line while intersecting the input combination that maximizes expected returns to shareholders after introduction of the tax credit. The distance between the points at which this line and the original budget line intersect the vertical axis equals the extent to which pre-tax input costs rise due to substitution induced by the tax credit. If the product of this higher cost and the probability of default exceeds the product of the after-tax cost reduction and the probability of being taxable, then the tax credit raises expected after-tax costs. This is possible because, with p 2 =0, the input combination that maximizes shareholder value is independent of the probability of default and the value of θ in default states; consequently, shareholders have excessive incentives to substitute
If the probability of bankruptcy is sufficiently great, and the two inputs are highly substitutable, then the costs associated with asset substitution may exceed the direct benefits of receiving tax credits.
Relation to other Agency Cost Models
The cost of the inefficiency generated by incentives to overinvest in tax-preferred assets (to the detriment of bondholders) is ultimately borne by shareholders, who are unable to commit their firms not to do so, and who therefore must pay higher interest rates. This result is similar in spirit to earlier work on incentives to distort the portfolio of investments financed using incomplete debt contracts. The option aspect of an equity claim implies that there are situations in which firms serve the interests of shareholders by making risky investments with negative expected present values and by foregoing safe investments with positive present values. 11 Lenders, who understand these incentives, demand higher interest rates in response. The incentive to overinvest in risky assets is perhaps somewhat subtler than the incentive to overinvest in tax-preferred assets, though it is similar in that the conflicting interests of shareholders and bondholders distort behavior and drive up interest rates in response. The bonus depreciation provisions introduced in 2002, the focus of the empirical analysis in Section 4, are noteworthy in this respect, as it is well known that longer-lived assets benefit significantly more from bonus depreciation than do shorter-lived assets.
To the extent that longer-lived assets are believed to be used for riskier investment projects, therefore, this investment subsidy program could be expected to aggravate this asset-substitution problem.
Incomplete debt contracts that distort investment decisions may simultaneously serve to correct other inefficiencies. There is considerable attention devoted to the use of debt to discipline managers and thereby reduce some of the agency problems between shareholders and managers. 12
Debt used for this purpose nevertheless becomes more costly when some assets but not all receive preferential tax treatment.
Extensions to the Model
This section considers four issues related to the model analyzed in section 2. The first is the ability of shareholders and bondholders to design contracts that reduce the agency costs that otherwise arise due to incomplete contracting. The second is the legal process that accompanies default, and the associated possibility that bondholders may not be able to recover the full value of a firm's assets in the face of determined opposition by shareholders. And the third is the potential incompleteness of tax carryforwards and carrybacks in settings with more than two periods.
Bond covenants
In principle, bondholders have available to them information that could be used to avoid some of the agency problems described in section 2. The model in section 2 posits that lenders are unable to observe the investment mix chosen by borrowers. Another possibility is that lenders could attach covenants to bond contracts that specify the types of investments borrowers are permitted to undertake. Optimally-chosen covenants would then be endogenous to the tax treatment of different assets, limiting the extent of permitted substitution into tax-preferred investments.
There are several well-known difficulties that such arrangements encounter in practice. 13 The first stems from the difficulty of recontracting in stochastic environments. Borrowers will want to change their investment plans over time based on new information. If strictly enforced, covenants prevent efficient adaption to changing circumstances and thereby reduce the interest rates that borrowers are willing to pay. If not strictly enforced, then -in the absence of symmetric information between borrowers and lenders -covenants will not prevent excessive substitution into tax-preferred investments. A second difficulty with bond covenants is that, in the presence of informational asymmetries, lenders will generally not have sufficient information to be able to write efficient covenants. Lenders may suspect that borrowers will adjust the composition of their investments in favor of assets that are eligible for tax credits, but do not know what fraction of the capital stock such assets would represent in the absence of tax incentives. A third difficulty with bond covenants has to do with their enforcement. Covenant violations can lead to renegotiation or termination of bond contracts, but dramatic remedies are costly to all parties and may increase the chance of an even costlier subsequent default. Partly for this reason, it is common for lenders 12 See, for example, Grossman and Hart (1982) , Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) , and Hart and Moore (1995) . 13 See, for example, Warner (1979), McDaniel (1986) , and Berlin and Loeys (1988) .
to waive at least some violations of covenant provisions. 14 From an ex ante standpoint, the potential costs associated with verifying compliance with covenant provisions and assessing damages for noncompliance reduces the desirability of attaching an excessive number of such restrictions to bond contracts, except in circumstances in which covenants are desperately needed.
Despite these difficulties, it is possible for bondholders to impose restrictions on borrowers that attenuate some of the effects analyzed in section 2. For example, borrowing rates could be made contingent on the fraction of tax-preferred assets in which a borrower invests. This type of restriction would change somewhat the solution derived in section 2 without changing its character unless such contracts could be applied perfectly. In practice, bond covenants typically do not have the kind of detailed provisions that would be required to tailor investment optimally, instead making their terms contingent on readily measured features of borrower behavior. 15
As noted by Smith and Warner (1979) , and empirically demonstrated by Bradley and Roberts (2004) , borrowing rates tend to be lower when financial debt covenants are included in loan contracts, controlling for observable risks. This is consistent with the covenant hypothesis that borrowers receive favorable borrowing rates in return for accepting debt covenants. Therefore, the analysis in Section 2 about the impact of investment credits on borrowing rates carries implications for financial debt covenants, which are extensively explored in Section 4. Financial debt covenants specify one or more accounting index and the thresholds of each variable at the inception of a loan. Each quarter, lenders examine the borrower's financial reports to determine whether the borrower's reported index exceeds the threshold. Upon violation of a financial debt covenant, a borrower is considered in technical default, in which case the lender can demand immediate repayment of a loan. Dichev and Skinner (2002) report that this extreme event rarely happens -instead, the loan terms are typically renegotiated, including the loan covenants. During this process, however, lenders may intervene the borrower's operating decisions by limiting the borrower's ability to make new investments, acquire other firms, or engage in other -possibly value-enhancing -actions. Dichev and Skinner (2002) also find that financial debt covenants are set relatively tight, and technical defaults occur quite frequently (in a typical quarter, about 15-20% of outstanding loans are in technical default), which implies that financial debt covenants provide lenders with at least a partial control over borrower actions that reflect moral hazard.
Default and bankruptcy
The model presented in section 2 contains a stylized treatment of the consequences of default.
In the model, firms that are unable to meet contractual debt obligations become the property of bondholders; this ownership transfer does not otherwise affect the value of the ongoing concern.
In practice, firm value may be adversely affected by the displacement of previous owners and by costs incurred during bankruptcy proceedings -and anticipation of such loss in value influences negotiations between defaulting firms and their creditors. Consequently, creditors of financially distressed firms may accept terms in which they are paid less than the value of existing assets. 16
It is possible to reinterpret the model's parameters to incorporate renegotiation and bankruptcy costs, as well as value transfers between bondholders and shareholders triggered by default. Costs associated with renegotiation and bankruptcy are reflected in reduced values of θ 3 . In the model's risk-neutral setting, the prospect of rent transfers from bondholders to shareholders of distressed firms is captured by higher than actual values of θ 2 and corresponding lower values of θ 3 . Such changes do not alter the model's properties and implications, though they do affect its empirical application.
Timing of tax credits
In the two-period model analyzed in section 2, profitable firms receive the benefits of tax credits at the same time that uncertainty is resolved and bondholders are paid. In practice, certain tax credits are available when investments are made and prior to the resolution of uncertainty. There are two significant features of this difference. The first is that it is possible for firms that are ultimately unprofitable to benefit from tax credits if the credits are received enough years prior to subsequent losses that the tax law does not permit the losses to be carried back against the credits. Under U.S. law, net operating losses can be carried back only two years for tax purposes.
Hence if an unprofitable firm's losses do not begin in earnest until more than two years after its initial investment, the firm benefits from any first-year credits.
There is a second aspect of tax credits received in the first year of an investment, which is that cash need not be disposed of in ways that are satisfactory to bondholders. In the absence of restrictions, credits received from tax-favored investments may be paid to shareholders as dividends or else invested in ways that benefit shareholders and not bondholders. If the firm defaults within the period of allowable carrybacks, the tax credit takes on the feature of a loan from the government that (from the standpoint of bondholders) shareholders are free to squander.
Anticipating this, the bond market demands higher interest rates on loans to firms receiving up-front tax credits. Alternatively, lenders can insist on covenants that restrict the ability of borrowers to pay dividends, but such restrictions introduce other inefficiencies and are often not included in bond contracts. 17
To formalize these ideas, suppose that n years elapse between initial investment and the 16 Ang et al. (1982) document the administrative costs of corporate bankruptcies and subsequent liquidations. Franks and Torous (1989), Franks and Torous (1994) , Eberhardt et al. (1990) , and Weiss (1990) offer evidence of the costs associated with recontracting and reorganization of firms in financial distress, and of value acquisition by shareholders in reorganizations.
17 Black and Scholes (1973) discuss the endogeneity of bond prices to anticipated dividend payout behavior. Smith and Warner (1979) report that only 23% of the bonds they examine (issued in 1974-75) restrict dividend payments; Kalay (1982) indicates that virtually all of the bond issues he analyzes have covenants limiting dividends; and McDaniel (1986) finds that, of the outstanding bonds of Fortune 100 companies in 1984, only 35% restrict dividend payments, and Lehn and Poulsen (1991) report that, of the bonds they examine, 33% of those issued in 1986 and 45% of those issued in 1989 contain covenants restricting dividend payments. Interestingly, Kalay (1982) finds that most of the firms in his sample pay fewer dividends than their bond covenants permit.
resolution of uncertainty (in the second period). A profitable firm receives a tax credit of cβ −n σ 1 K in the first period, in which β = 1 1+d > 0 is the firm's discount factor, and d its annual rate of discount, so the tax credit is worth cσ 1 K in second-period terms. If the firm incurs a loss in the second period, then it is eligible to claim a refund for (nominal) taxes paid earlier. The fact that the firm received the tax credit in the first period reduces its second period refund by cβ −n σ 1 K.
Consequently, the tax credit is worth c(1 − β −n )σ 1 K in present value to a firm that is ultimately unprofitable. n = ∞ corresponds to situations in which default occurs beyond the time limit for tax carrybacks.
Consider the case in which a firm receiving a tax credit in the first period allocates a fraction γ of the credit to its shareholders (in the form of dividends), with (1 − γ) remaining within the firm and therefore accessible to bondholders in the case of default in the second period. In this setting, shareholders benefit from tax credits even if the firm ultimately defaults. Hence, this modification changes equation (1) to:
Equation (7) is likewise affected, since bond market equilibrium must satisfy:
Imposing (24) and (25) changes the expression that appears on the right sides of equations (17) and (23); for example, (23) becomes:
The right side of equation (26) exhibits features similar to those of the right sides of (17) and (23). If n = 0 and γ = 0 then of course they are identical. If n = ∞ and γ = 0 then the right side of (26) becomes:
, so a somewhat larger value of f η is required for higher levels of c to be associated with reduced investment and profitability. If γ = (1 − β −n ), then the right side of (26) becomes [p 1 + (1 − β −n )(p 2 + p 3 )] σ 1 (1 − f η), and again f η =1 is the critical value at which the effect of c on investment and profitability changes sign. What these scenarios illustrate is that the implications of (17) and (23) Bonus depreciation offers a very generous tax incentive for equipment investment, particularly for long-lived equipment for which depreciation deductions would otherwise have a significantly lower present value. As a result, firms can be expected to substitute relatively tax-favored investments for relatively tax-disfavored investments during the bonus depreciation period.
Bondholders have very little interest in firms taking advantage of bonus depreciation to improve their after-tax returns by investing in qualifying long-lived equipment assets, since expected returns to bondholders are maximized by firm actions that maximize the present value of expected pretax profits. Consequently, lenders have incentives to impose greater restrictions on loans during the bonus period than they do at other times; while these restrictions may entail greater costs of impeding efficient ex post decision making and triggering costs associated with recontracting, they address the greater moral hazard introduced by bonus depreciation. As a result of these costs, and the residual inefficiency in investment asset composition due to incentives created by bonus depreciation, firms are also less apt to find it worthwhile to finance their new investments with loans from third parties. The propositions that new loans are more likely to come with restrictions and that there will be fewer new loans are both testable with the available data.
Data
Data on loan covenants are collected by Dealscan, which is maintained by Thompson Reuters LPC. Dealscan contains detailed information on private debt, including identities of lender and borrowers, loan types, loan maturities, loan inception date, and covenants. Dealscan collects the great majority of loan data from SEC filings, from newspapers, or through LPC's relationships with major banks. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Carey and Hrycray (1999) report that Dealscan coverage includes more than 50-75% of the value of all commercial loans since 1995. Starting in 1993, Dealscan began to include detailed covenant information, which is the most important element in the dataset for our analysis. The Dealscan data include counts of different types of debt covenants -financial debt covenants, prepayment covenants, dividend covenants, and secured covenants. The focus of the empirical work is on financial debt covenants used by lenders to constrain borrower operations. Other types of debt covenants are typically used to limit the ability of borrowers to distribute resources in a way that is not recoverable by lenders. Dealscan provides 17 different accounting indexes used with financial debt covenants, including current ratio, net worth, EBITDA, and capital expenditure. Table 1 medians across all variables are quite similar, except for mean values of q -which has an extremely high variance. As a general matter, firms for which there are both Dealscan and Compustat data are larger in size, older, and financially stronger than average firms in Compustat. This is consistent with the data collection procedure of Dealscan, since the SEC 10-K filings that serve as the primary source for Dealscan require mandatory reporting only for larger loans.
Among Dealscan-Compustat firms there is a 9.5% chance that at least one loan is reported in a given quarter. Approximately half of these loans (49.9%) have at least one financial covenant attached. The mean number of any financial covenants attached to a loan is 1.43; the mean number of capital expenditure covenants is 0.17; and the mean number of EBITDA covenants is 0.3714.
Loan Covenants and Bonus Depreciation.
The extent to which loans bear covenant restrictions can be measured four ways, the first of which is simply the number of all financial covenants attached to a loan. Greater numbers of covenants typically offer lenders greater control over borrowers' operating decisions by making technical defaults more likely to occur; Bradley and Roberts (2004) add all financial and nonfinancial covenants to measure "covenant intensity." A second measure of loan restrictiveness is simply the likelihood that any given loan includes a financial covenant. A third measure of loan restrictiveness is the number of capital expenditure covenants attached to a loan; these typically limit total capital spending. Given the moral hazard introduced by favorable tax treatment of certain classes of capital spending, this type of financial covenant directly addresses an important conflict of interest. And the fourth measure of loan restrictiveness is the number of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) covenants attached to a loan.
Since the moral hazard implied by bonus deprecation has the effect of reducing EBITDA in return for an even greater reduction in taxes, EBITDA restrictions are potentially quite attractive to lenders. Figure 3 depicts the aggregate use of bond covenants in the Dealscan data between 1999 and 2007, as measured by these four proxies. Across all the four measures, the aggregate restrictiveness of new loans appears countercyclical. This is not surprising, because lenders benefit most from greater control over borrower operations when moral hazard carries the greatest consequences for lenders -and that is when default probabilities are highest, commonly during recessions. Table 2 illustrates these classifications.
Due to the somewhat arbitrary nature of the period division, many infrequent borrowers, defined by borrowers whose typical borrowing intervals are longer than 3 years, may be thought of as randomly assigned into all three groups, which are denoted as I-2, II-2, and III-2. What makes one type different from another is, however, the existence of firms with a typical borrowing interval less than 3 years, and their self-selection into three types. That is, some of these firms, denoted as I-1 in Table 2 , do stay in the private debt market even during the recession period and start a new loan, while there are other firms, denoted as II-1, which otherwise would have wanted to borrow, but did not do so, during the same period. Therefore, one can expect that only Type I includes frequent borrowers that successfully finance through private debts during the recession period, and Type II includes firms that may have wanted to borrow in 2002-2004, but did not. It is noteworthy that loans taken by Type II and Type III firms include more covenants than those taken by Type I firms for all periods. This is perhaps not surprising, since only Type I includes frequent borrowers who may have higher credit ratings and better ongoing relationships with lenders. It is also significant that differences in numbers of financial covenants between Type I and Type II prior to the introduction of bonus depreciation are generally larger than the differences between Type I and Type III during the bonus depreciation period. Coupled with the observation from Table 3 that Type II is the financially weakest group, it suggests that, being financially constrained, firms that drop out of the private debt market during the bonus period (and thus are included in Type II by construction) would have been offered more restrictive loan terms than they could afford.
In estimating the impact of tax policy on borrowing restrictions, it is helpful to distinguish firms by the extent to which they are financially constrained and the extent to which their assets are likely to be affected by tax changes. Firms subject to greater financial constraints are at greater risk of bankruptcy than are other firms, and are therefore trigger the most concern for lenders. A recent study by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) proposes a financial constraint index consisting solely of information on a firm's size and age; Hadlock and Pierce argue that, among the available alternatives, this index is the least likely to suffer from problems associated with endogenous financial decisions. The Hadlock and Pierce ("S-A") measure is: (-0.737* size) + (0.043* size 2 ) -(0.040*age): so that the higher is the S-A index of a firm, the more financially constrained it is. Presumably, lenders have more serious concerns over firms with higher measured values of the S-A index.
Firms whose balance sheets contain larger fractions of longer-lived capital assets benefit the most from bonus depreciation and have production technologies that can accommodate greater shifting of assets to tax-preferred categories in response to tax changes. In the Compustat data, capital intensity is measured as the ratio of after-depreciation plant and equipment to total assets in 2000 (the same ratio constructed using 1998 data serves as a robustness check), so higher measured capital intensity implies an emphasis on longer-lived assets. As a result of the introduction of bonus depreciation, lenders are apt to be most concerned with financially constrained firms of high capital intensity, and attempt to place new restrictions on their borrowing. To examine the impact of bonus depreciation on private debt market participation, the baseline empirical equation is:
where Restrictiveness it is the dependent variable for loan restrictiveness measured in the four different ways described above, Bonus t is a time dummy equal to one when the year-quarter lies Note that, in order to measure the restrictiveness of loans, the sample for this regression includes only firms starting at least one new loan from 1999-2007. This restriction may introduce some bias due to the omission of observations of characteristics of loans that were discouraged by the introduction of bonus depreciation, though this generally works against the findings that appear in the regression tables.
The first panel of Table 5 , consisting of Columns (1) to (2), presents estimated coefficients from regressions that examine average numbers of financial debt covenants attached to a loan.
Column (1) reports estimated coefficients from a panel regression, with all types of firms, using firm and year fixed effects. The coefficient on the variable of primary interest, Bonus t *SA it *CI i , is estimated to be 0.3081 and statistically significant. To interpret this result it is necessary also to consider the coefficient on Bonus t *CI i , which is estimated to be 1.0957, also significantly different from zero. An increase in capital intensity index by 1 is correlated with an increase in the number of covenants attached to a loan by 1.0957 during the bonus period. Since the standard deviation of capital intensity is around 0.25 (see Table 1 The third and fourth panels of Table 5 present coefficients from regressions using the same 18 Note that capital intensity, being time-invariant (it is measured in year 2000), is omitted due to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. The Size-Age index is included in the empirical equation, but has very little effect on the regression results, reflecting that the Size-Age index is quite stable over time.
19 The other coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 These estimates imply that the combined impact on the number of Capital Expenditure covenants as well as on the number of EBITDA covenants explains two-thirds on the impact on the total number of covenants attached to a loan: that is, 0.3081 ≈ 2/3*(0.1021 + 0.1277). Given that Capital Expenditure and EBITDA covenants are not the most frequently used covenants, this pattern is consistent with an interpretation that these two types of covenants may have been used particularly to control for moral hazard problems aggravated by bonus depreciation.
Bonus Depreciation and Borrowing
The greater moral hazard introduced by bonus depreciation raises the cost of borrowing and thereby discourages the likelihood and level of borrowing. It is possible to use the Dealscan and Compustat data to measure the extent to which corporate borrowing declined during 2002-2004, particularly among firms most apt to be affected by the tax change.
One important measure of borrowing is whether a firm takes a new loan in a given quarter.
Tax effects can be measured by the following empirical equation:
in which BorrowingDummy it is dummy for whether firm i starts a new loan at time t, and the independent variables are the same as in prior equations. The intuition behind the specification of equation (28) resembles that underlying equation (27) . The more financially constrained and capital-intense a firm is, the more likely it faces restrictive loan contracts with borrowing terms that contain high default premiums. Consequently, these firms are more likely than others either not to invest or to finance their investments with equity or retained earnings.
The first three columns of Table 6 report estimated coefficients from linear probability regressions in which the dependent variable takes the value one if a firm has a Dealscan-reported loan in a quarter, and zero otherwise. In the regression reported in Column (1), the -0.0287 coefficient on the interaction of bonus depreciation, the S-A index, and capital intensity suggests that, during the bonus depreciation period, a firm at the 75th percentile of SA index is 0.76% point (0.0287*0.25*1.0664) less likely to borrow from the private debt market than a firm at the 25th percentile of SA index when its capital intensity increases by 0.25 (one standard deviation increase of capital intensity). Controlling for industry-specific shocks, column (2) reports a similar set of coefficients as column (1).
The fixed-effects logit regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) report similar patterns.
In the specification reported in Column (3), the coefficient on Bonus t *CI i is estimated to be -2.0369. Thus, one standard deviation increase, or 0.25, in capital intensity reduces the odds of financing through private debt by 40% (=1-exp(-2.0369*0.25)). In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of bonus depreciation, the S-A index, and capital intensity, Bonus t *SA it *CI i , is estimated to be -0.5527. Thus, compared to a firm with an average SA index, a firm with an SA index one standard deviation higher has a 14% = (1-exp (-0.5527*0.25*1.0664)) reduced chance of borrowing during the bonus depreciation period. 20
Although the empirical work focuses on behavior in private debt markets, borrowers have the option of turning to the public debt market instead. There are two reasons, however, why this type of substitution is unlikely to offer a satisfactory substitute for expensive and constrained private borrowing. First, as noted by "pecking order" theory of finance, there is a significant entry barrier for lower-credit borrowers to enter the public debt markets, so firms that are most affected by potential moral hazard considerations are the least likely to be able to access public debt markets. Second, public debt participants have the same moral hazard concerns as private lenders, and are just as likely to require covenants and high default premiums in response to the introduction of bonus depreciation.
It is instructive to consider the determinants of total borrowing reported by Compustat, and to compare the results with those obtained using the Dealscan private debt data. Net debt issuance is measured two ways, using the Compustat data and following Kahle and Stulz (2010) . The first debt issuance measure is long-term debt issuance minus retirement, both of which come from firms' cash flow statements. Specifically, the first measure is calculated as long term debt issuance minus long term debt retirement divided by lagged assets. Significantly, this includes information only on long term debt. The second measure comes from firms' balance sheets. With current liabilities information, the second measure includes short-term debt issuance as well, calculated as changes in long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by lagged assets. 21
20 One might argue that the relation between private debt market participation and tax policy does not necessarily imply that the size of private debt is also sensitive to tax policy. Table 7 reports the results of estimating regressions similar to equation (28), using Loan Amountit as a dependent variable. Column (1) presents coefficients estimated from a linear regression. The sign and significance of the coefficient on Bonust*SAit*CIi are as expected. Since the dependent variable is zero for many of the observations, it is also useful to estimate a Tobit regression, the coefficients of which are presented in column (2), and are qualitatively similar to those appearing in column (1).
21 See Appendix for variable descriptions in detail.
The regressions reported in Table 8 estimate the following equation:
Net total debt issuance is the dependent variable in the regressions reported in the first two columns of Table 8 , while net long-term debt issuance is the dependent variable in the regressions reported in Columns (3) and (4). Column (1) (3) and (4) 
Conclusion
The availability of tax subsidies for investments in some assets and not others gives firms incentives to change the composition of their investments. Such substitution is inefficient, and, if anticipated, will raise borrowing costs, reduce the payoff to new investments, and thereby reduce the stimulatory effect of investment credits on aggregate investment. This effect is so strong that there are plausible circumstances in which greater investment credits are associated with reduced aggregate investment.
Aggregate investment studies typically find only limited evidence of stimulatory effects of tax subsidies on investment. Studies of disaggregated investment behavior report significant tax effects that reflect, at least in part, the ability of investors to substitute some asset types for others.
The aggregate findings are consistent with firm-level evidence if asset substitutability reduces the aggregate effect of tax credits targeted at specific categories of investments. Evidence from borrowing behavior around the introduction of bonus depreciation for U.S. equipment investment conforms to predictions of the model. Corporate bonds contained greater numbers of restrictive covenants during the period in which U.S. tax policy distorted the composition of U.S. investment in favor of equipment; furthermore, it appears that corporate borrowing declined during this period. These effects were most pronounced for firms in precarious financial positions and those whose investments where most apt to be affected by the tax incentives.
The unequal taxation of differing assets is understood to distort the allocation of resources in society, and there are numerous studies of the magnitudes of these distortions in various settings. 22 Summers (1987) challenges their implications, arguing that, since economies generally underinvest due to tax and other distortions, policies that affect the rate of investment have far greater influence on economic welfare than do policies that affect the composition of investment. What is not generally appreciated is the connection between these two considerations, that the distortionary nature of many tax subsidies influences the level as well as the composition of investment. Bond covenants impose costly restrictions, so are used only when lenders are sufficiently concerned about moral hazard that they feel the costs are worth paying. The greater use of bond covenants when firms were entitled to bonus depreciation, and accompanying drop in borrowing, are consistent with a model in which concerns about asset substitution increased the cost of debt-financed investment, thereby reducing the aggregate stimulatory effect of investment incentives. (1) - (2) is the average number of total financial covenants attached to a loan; the dependent variable of column (3) - (4) is the likelihood of a loan having at least one covenant; the dependent variable of column (5) - (6) is the average number of Capital Expenditure covenants attached to a loan; and the dependent variable of column (7) - (8) is the average number of EBITDA covenants attached to a loan. The specifications in the even-numbered columns also include industry-year fixed effects to absorb industry-wide shocks. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. , the total size of private loans which firm i starts at time t, divided by total assets. Observations with LoanAmount it greater than 100% or less than 0% are excluded. Column (1) runs a linear fixed-effect panel regression with standard errors clustered at the firm-level. Column (2) runs a fixedeffects Tobit regression with standard errors calculated using bootstrap, as specified by the Stata code created by Bo E. Honoré (See Honoré (1992) ). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Variable descriptions appear in Appendix. Restrictiveness it is calculated essentially the same as above, except that only Capital Expenditure-related covenants are counted. In Dealscan data, there is only one type of such covenant ("Max. Capex"), so it is similar to a dummy variable.
-Proxy 4: The likelihood that any given loan includes a financial covenant.
A dummy is coded as one when a loan package has any financial covenant, otherwise zero. Restrictiveness it is then calculated as the expected value of this dummy for firm i at time t. In the example above, the likelihood that firm i has a loan that has a financial covenant at time t is 50%.
• BorrowingDummy it is equal to one when firm i has a new loan at time t; zero otherwise.
• LoanAmount it is the sum of all private loan amounts, reported in Dealscan, firm i starts at time t, divided by total assets. By construction, it is positive when BorrowingDummy it is one; zero otherwise.
